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THE REQUIREMENT OF A RELIGIOUS BELIEF FOR
COMPETENCY OF A WITNESS
COMMON LAW RuLz
Since the very first trials were conducted, the competent witness
has been a necessary link through which the plaintiff or defendant
must prove his case. Many elements make up the requirements that
determine whether or not a witness is competent. Under the com-
mon law, mental incapacity, conviction of a crime, or direct interest
in the outcome of the litigation would disqualify a witness. Another
requirement strictly adhered to was the rule that the witness must
have a belief in God. This meant that before a witness could testify
and before a jury might weigh his testimony, the witness had to
swear to a belief in God or in a Supreme Being. This common law
requirement was carried over into the jurisprudence of this country.
The oath administered to a witness called upon God to witness that
what was said would be true and invoked divine vengeance if what
was said were false.
The purpose of this oath was not to call the attention of God to
the witness, but the attention of the witness to God; not to call upon
Him to punish the false swearer, but to remind the witness that he
will assuredly do so. By thus laying hold of the conscience of the
witness and appealing to his sense of accountability, the law best
insured the utterance of truth.
In England, prior to 1744, it was considered, on authority from
Coke, that the law allowed only a Christian to testify, since the oath
-was an appeal to the God of the Bible.1 However, in a 1744 decision,
the strict rule underwent a slight modification. In the case of
Omichund v. Barker2 , the court said:
Nothing but the belief in a God, and that he will reward and
punish us according to our deserts, is necessary to qualify
a man to take an oath. Though I am of opinion that infidels who
believe in a God and future rewards and punishments in the
other world may be witnesses, yet I am as clearly of opinion
that if they do not believe in a God or future rewards and punish-
ments, they ought not to be admitted as witnesses.
3
In a concurring opinion Lord Hardwick said that all that was
1. 6 WIGM0o0 Ev'mINC § 1817 (3d ed. 1940).
2. 1 Atk. 45; 125 Eng. Rep. 1310 (1744).
3. Lord Chief Justice Willes speaking for the court.
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necessary to an oath was an appeal to a Supreme Being, and think-
ing of Him as the rewarder of truth and the avenger of falsehood.4
This allowed the Jew and the Mohammedan as wvell as the Christian
to testify as a witness. However, the atheist or agnostic still could
not qualify.
These criteria for a witness' competency were generally adopted
in the United States.5 The question was whether or not the obliga-
tion of an oath had a binding tie upon the witness' conscience. Or,
in other words, did the witness believe in the existence of a God who
would punish his perjury? If he swore falsely, did the witness be-
lieve he would be punished by an overruling Providence, either in
this world or in the world to come? 6
MODIVICATION op CoMMoN LAW RULE
The strict common law rule has undergone significant modification
in some jurisdictions. To what degree the competency of a witness
is dependent on religious belief is not easy to ascertain in every case.
But important changes have been made in many jurisdictions by ex-
press constitutional or statutory provisions. Relief from the require-
ment has commonly been found under constitutional provisions guar-
anteeing that theological belief shall not affect one's civil capacities
(or, specifically, one's competency as a witness). These provisions
are almost universal. 7
The courts have not hesitated to ease the rule in some jurisdic-
tions. In an early Iowa case it was held that a witness could not be
compelled to testify as to his opinions on matters of religious faith
for the purpose of showing his incompetency.8 The Florida Court
has held that neither belief in a Supreme Being nor in a divine punish-
ment is requisite to the competency of a witness. 9 A sense of moral
responsibility on the part of a witness, not belief in a Supreme Being,
is the test of a witness' qualifications in Connecticut.' 0  Minnesota
has held specifically, that a competent witness does not have to believe
in God." As early as 1840 the Indiana Supreme Court held, in a
4. Omichund v. Barker, 1 Atk. 45, 125 Eng. Rep. 1310 (1744).
5. 6 WIGMORE, EVID NCE § 1817 (3d ed. 1940).
6. The distinction of whether the punishment is believed to impend in a
future existence or in the present one caused some difficulty at first The Eng-
lish Court declared the distinction immaterial and American Courts particularly
in later rulings, have reached the same results. See Blocker v. Burness, 2 Ala.
355 (1841); Noble v. People, 1 Ill. 56 (1822); Jones v. Harris, 1 Strob. 160
(S. C. 1846).
7. 6 WIGmoit, EvmExcE § 1828 (3d ed. 1940).
8. Dedric v. Hopson 62 Iowa 562, 17 N. W. 772 (1883).
9. Thomas v. State, 73 Fla. 115,74 So. 1 (1917).
10. Ruocco v. Logiscco, 104 Conn. 585, 134 Ati. 73 (1926).
11. State v. Peterson, 167 Minn. 216, 208 N. W. 761 (1926).
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most unusual decision, that even a deaf or dumb person would be a
competent witness if he understood that perjury was punished by
law, though he had no conception of the religious obligation of an
oath.' 2
Most jurisdictions are adopting the test of the Illinois Court as
set out in the recent case of People v. Mueller :13 "The test of re-
ligious belief or opinion in this state [Illinois] is no longer required
to determine a witness' competency, the requirement is one of intel-
ligence or understanding on the part of a witness."
In New Jersey, the common law rule is still in force, i. e., it is
necessary that a witness believe in a Supreme Being before he may
testify. However, the New Jersey Court early created an exception
in one situation. The Court said that the statutory right of a party
to testify in his own behalf was a civil right, the enjoyment of which
could not, under the state constitution, be denied to any person mere-
ly because of his religious principles.' 4
From the decisions, statutes and constitutions, it can be noted that
in many states1 5 no religious opinion is required.16 In some states
even an atheist may be a competent witness.' 7 Six jurisdictions,
however, still appear to follow the old common law rule.' 8
As in other cases when competency is at issue, the trial judge
determines whether or not the witness has sufficient understanding
of the oath he is taking. In cases where the competency of a witness
is attacked for religious disbeliefs, there is a presumption in favor
of a competent religious faith. The burden of showing a want of
belief rests upon the party objecting to the witness.' 9 Furthermore,
the witness' belief in God is to be presumed until the contrary is
shown.20 When a witness is accused of being an atheist, there is
a presumption in favor of his competency and such an accusation
12. Snyder v. Nations, 5 Blackf. 295 (Ind. 1840).
13. People v. Mueller, 2 111. 2d 311, 313, 118 N. E. 2d, 1, 2 (1954).
14. State v. Power, 51 N. J. L. 432, 17 At. 969 (1889).
The Court made it clear, however, that it did not mean to imply that
religion did not affect the competency of a witness. The ruling was simply
restricted to the civil rights of the proffered witness himself.
15. California, Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Massa-
chusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Jersey (where witness is testifying in his own behalf) New
Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia and Wisconsin.
16. 42 A. L. P. 553.
17. Connecticut, Florida, Kentucky, Maine, Missouri, New York, Tennessee,
Texas.
18. Alabama, Arkansas, Maryland, North Carolina, New Jersey, South Car-
olina.
19. State v. Cooper, 2 Overt. 96, 5 Am. Dec. 656 (Tenn.)
20. Donnelly v. State, 26 N. J. L. (2 Dutch.) 463 (1857).
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must be proved. 2 1 In proving religious disbelief, the testimony of
others may be taken concerning the witness or the court may decide
on explanation by the party himself.2 2
Legislation in this area has been very limited. In no jurisdiction
has the use of the oath been abolished by statute.2 3 However, in
all but a few jurisdictions (e. g., Oklahoma and Virginia) a statute
does allow the witness to choose to make an affirmation instead of an
oath.2 4 This choice is usually provided for those who lack the requi-
site belief and for those who may have the belief but are forbidden
,to swear by conscientious scruples.
2 5
COMPETENCY OF CHILDREN
Most jurisdictions fail to provide any exception to the general rule
or any special rule for the competency of children qualified to testify
but lacking in theological understanding. This is unfortunate, for
they are a special class of persons of whom an oath ought not to be
required nor even the exercise of an option to affirm be expected.
It has long been settled in the American cases that if a witness called
to testify is of tender years, the opposite party may require that he
shall be examined as to his understanding of the nature and obliga-
tion of an oath.26
However, the courts in the United States as well as in England
have been liberal in declaring a child competent to testify. It will
suffice to mention only a few such holdings here.
A child, believing that falsehood will be punished in a future state,
though ignorant of the meaning of an oath, was allowed to testify in
Comnonwealth v. Ellenger.2 7 As early as 1884 the Missouri Court
held that the fact that a child, otherwise competent, had never re-
ceived religious instruction did not disqualify him as a witness. 28
Moreover, a child may become competent to take the oath after an
interlocutory instruction by the Court. It is settled that a previous
21. Commonwealth v. Winnemore, 1 Brewst. 356 (Pa. 1867).
22. Central Military Tract. Ry. Co. v. Rockafellow, 17 Ill. 541 (1856).
But note the old Delaware case of State v. Townsend, 2 Har. 543 (Del.
1837), where after evidence of witness' belief was admitted, his own assertion
of a change of belief, made at the time he was offered to be sworn, did not
restore him to competency.
23. 6 WIGO R , EviDENcz § 1828 (3d ed. 1940).
24. See CODS OF LAWS OV SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 26-4.
25. 6 WIGMORE, EVMENCM § 1828 (3d ed. 1940).
26. See, e. g., People v. McNair, 21 Wend. 608 (N. Y. 1839).
27. 1 Brewst. 352 (Pa. 1867).
But see Jones v. State, 145 Ala. 51, 40 So. 947 (1906), where a girl, who
had been to Church and Sunday School and thought that if she lied, God would
put her in jail, was excluded.
28. Cadmus v. St. Lo. Bridge and Tunnel Co., 15 Mo. App. 86 (1884)..
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general religious education is not necessary, and that the judge may
then and there impart theological instruction and produce the neces-
sary belief.2 9
The age of the witness apparently makes no.difference. The Ohio
Court allowed a four year old child to testify, who on examination
said that if he didn't tell the truth, "God won't love me."30
The Federal Courts have likewise been liberal in finding children
competent who do not possess complete knowledge of an oath. The
rule as generally stated is that a child of sufficient intelligence to
have a just appreciation of the difference between right and wrong,
and a proper consciousness of the punishment for false swearing, is
competent to testify.31 The fact that a child's testimony is intelligent-
ly given and that he believes that it is wrong to lie is generally a
better indication of competency than is the child's knowledge of an
obligation of an oath or its idea of where liars go now or hereafter.
Many courts have accepted this line of reasoning.
THE Rum Ix SOUTH CAROLINA
South Carolina authority in this area is limited. The reports yield
few occasions where the Supreme Court has passed on the question
of the competency of a witness based on religious belief. In an
1833 case, Justice O'Neall speaking for the court said:
[T]he man who believes he is- under no legal or moral obliga-
tion at all times and under all circumstances, to tell the truth
under the sanction of an oath, has destroyed the only test by
which he can claim credit at the hands of men . . . . The wit-
ness holds such opinion of the obligation of an oath, as to render
him unworthy of belief, when he has called God to witness the
truth of what he asserts.
32
In Jones v. Harris,33 the rule which is generally considered to be
the present law in South Carolina was pronounced. In this old case
the Court said that where a witness has been objected to on account
of defective religious belief, an acknowledgment of belief in God
and His providence was sufficient to establish his competency. Forty
years later, in State v. Belton,3 4 the Court reaffirmed the rule as
stated in Jones v. Harris. Mr. Chief Justice Simpson, speaking for
29. 6 WIGMoV, EVIDENCE § 1821 (3d ed. 1940).
30. Hell v. Skinner, 81 Ohio App. 375, 79 N. E. 2d 787 (1949). [Action for
injuries sustained by the child when bitten by defendants' dog.]
31. William v. United States, 3 App. D. C. 335 (1894).
32. Anonymous, 1 Hill 251 (S. C. 1833).
33. 1 Strob. 160 (1846).
34. 24 S. C. 185 (1886).
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the majority, held incompetent as a witness a boy of twelve who
could repeat the Lord's Prayer and had heard that the bad man
caught those who lied. However, the child had never heard of a
God, or the devil, or of heaven or hell, or of the Bible, and had no
idea what became of the good or the bad after death.
The last decision on this subject appears to be the case of State v.
Abercrombie3 5 which again stated that a belief in God and His provi-
dence was necessary to establish the competency of a witness objected
to on account of defective religious belief.
CoNcIusloN
We have no holding in South Carolina concerning an atheist or
agnostic, but if our cases are carried to their logical conclusions, they
would not be allowed to testify. It would seem to be a better rule to
apply the test used in many other jurisdictions, i. e., if the witness
understands right from wrong and realizes the gravity of what he is
saying, he should be competent to testify. Otherwise, the day will
come in South Carolina when not an ordinary witness who is in-
terested in a case but some eminent, though unbelieving scientist, who
happens to be the sole eye-witness of a serious accident will be re-
fused as a witness on the ground that he does not believe in God and
in a divine providence after death.
VimGrI W. Duivvi, JR.
35. 130 S. C. 358, 126 S. E. 142 (1925).
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